Connect the MCP server in the portal →
The guided connect page mints a scoped MCP access token and walks you through your client’s config.
mcp:read, mcp:write, mcp:messages), always expiring, revocable, and
shown once. Inference keys (aireserve_api_…) are deliberately refused at this endpoint — a
leaked inference credential must never gain management powers. Export the token once and let
every config below read it from the environment, so no secret lands in a file that might get
committed:
Claude Code
-s user for all your projects. For a committable
project config use .mcp.json — ${AIRESERVE_MCP_TOKEN} expands from the environment:
claude mcp list (or /mcp in a session). Tools surface as
mcp__aireserve__… — try mcp__aireserve__whoami.
Codex
codex mcp add only handles stdio servers; remote HTTP servers go in
~/.codex/config.toml, with the bearer token referenced by environment variable. The same
config is honored by the Codex CLI, the IDE extension, and the ChatGPT desktop app:
codex mcp list.
Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json (global) or .cursor/mcp.json (per project). Note Cursor’s env
interpolation is ${env:VAR} — not Claude Code’s ${VAR}:
What agents can do — and what they can’t
Live, role-bounded tools
The tool list is computed per request from the connected user’s live role and the token’s
scopes — an analyst and an admin literally see different tools, and revoking the token
(profile page) applies on the next request. Fixed extras:
whoami, list-models,
get-model, and send-message — one-shot inference, metered and billed like every other
request.Consent & secrets
Sensitive writes take a two-step confirm round-trip before executing. Operations that
return secrets — minting an API key, say — never hand the secret to the model: the agent
receives a signed portal link, and the secret renders in your signed-in browser only.